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SINGLE EVENT UPSET AND LATCHUP
SENSITIVE DEVICES IN SATELLITE SYSTEMS
Richard H. Maurer
James D. Kinnison
The Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory
Laurel, MD 20723-6099
Abstract: We present a decision tree to systematically evaluate the potential use
of single event sensitive devices in spacecraft systems. We present several
concrete examples of branches on the tree.
1. IIitroduction
Satellite systems must be able to
survive the hazards of space, including
single event upset and latchup.
However, the choice of electronic
components may also be constrained by
the need to perform a particular
mission, by schedule, or by cost. Using
radiation hardened parts is not feasible
in many cases, so the effect of the
radiation environment on integrated
circuits must be assessed.
The sensitivity of each device
must be measured to achieve reliable
In
satellite system performance.
general, all tests of this nature involve
exposing an integrated circuit to a
monoenergetic charged particle beam
and measuring the frequency of event
occurrence. In practice, this process can
be implemented in a variety of ways,
some of which are more fruitful than
others. In any case, the data gathered in
single event upset or latchup testing is
used to estimate the on-orbit behavior of
a device.
Inevitably, some crucial
integrated circuit exhibits undesirable
behavior; a device may latch up, or may

be overly sensitive to single event upset.
This typically occurs in the only device
in a system" which cannot be replaced.
Therefore, some means of recovering
from undesirable phenomena must be
implemented. For instance, a resistor in
series with a device which latches up
can prevent damage to the device; in
addition, latchup detection and
correction circuits may be implemented
which automatically recover from
latchup.
Similarly, system-level
techniques can be used to compensate
for a device which is overly sensitive to
single event upset. A decision tree
representing a systematic approach to
evaluate the use of single event sensitive
devices is given in Figure 1.
2. Latchup and Latchup Protection
The first decision point on the
Single Event Effects Decision Tree
(Figure 1) is the box containing the
question, "Does the device latch?".
Ideally, one does not want to fly any
such device; but there may be
compelling reasons for considering a
latchup sensitive device (e.g. a gate
array or digital signal processor). To
perform the required mission may
necessitate use of such a device.
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CMOS VLSI digital devices
generally need to be screened for
latchup using a Californium system or
an accelerator as a heavy ion source. If
the device does latch up, the
experimenter needs to determine
important parameters including the
latchup threshold, the latchup
asymptotic cross section, the range of
the latched state currents (usually in
hundreds of milliamps) and the range of
the latched state holding currents
(usually less than 10 milliamps).
Hopefully, the latched state will
have some distinctly different
characteristics from the normal
operating states of the device so that a
latchup protection circuit can be
designed, if necessary. The difference
between the operating current and the
latched state current is one parameter
that can be sensed; the change in logic
state on an output or driver pin is
another.
In order to return a device from a
potentially destructive latched state to a
normal operating state, the supply
current to the device must be limited by
a resistor to prevent device burnout, and
the supply current must be reduced to a
level below the holding current.
Implementing such protection in
satellite hardware creates weight,
volume and power penalties. There
may also be some performance impact
on the device itself especially with
respect to speed of operation.

For some missions, such as a
shuttle mission, the environment is
benign and the mission duration is
short. In such a case the program office
may elect to accept the risk of the device

la tching and use it without any
protection.
An intermediate case could be
one in which adequate latchup
protection is not possible because of an
inability to sense a latched state or
monitor the device. Even if the program
were willing to support the latchup
protection circuit design, a redesign or
part substitution would be necessary.
Example: ADSP2100A1
A latchup protection, detection
and removal circuit may also have to
restart a device such as a processor to
continue normal system operation after
a latchup occurs. An example of such a
circuit, designed for the Analog Devices
ADSP2100A digital signal processor, is
shown in Figure 2.
A small resistance in series with
the device power pins protects the chip
by limiting the latchup current, and
prevents the VCC bond wires from
melting. When a latchup occurs, the
current through the resistor increases
and the voltage applied to the
ADSP2100A drops. This drop is sensed
by a comparator, producing a signal that
clocks a flip flop, creating a latch detect
signal. This signal is used to turn off the
series transistor, which removes power
from the device VCC pins. At the same
time, the entire board is reset. In order
to extinguish the parasitic SCR that
forms the latchup, all sources of current
that sustain the SCR must be eliminated.
In CMOS devices, the device input pins
are connected to the chip VCC bus
through a diode. Therefore, input pins
driven high could supply current to
sustain the SCR. To prevent this, the
latch detect signal is used to tri-state or
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force low all signals that drive
ADSP2100A inputs.
The ADSP2100A processor board
is under the control of the subsystem
main processor. The main processor can
set or clear the latch detect flip flop with
software. After the latchup has been
extinguished, the main processor clears
the latch detect flip flop, which allows
power to be applied to the device and
inputs to be driven.
.
Unforeseen problems, such as a
greater than expecte~ device current
increase due to total dose damage in the
ADSP2100, could cause the supply
current to exceed the threshold of the
latch detect circuit. In order to prevent
continuous triggering of the latch detect
circuit due to total dose damage, the
function can be disabled. The latchup
disable/ enable function is under
software control of the subsystem main
processor. When disabled, the latch
current would limited by a resistor, but
would not be automatically switched off
in the event of a latchup.
The latch detect signal is used to
generate an interrupt to the subsystem
main processor. The interrupt service
routine reloads the RAM based
ADSP2100A software, clears the latch
detect flip flop after a fixed length delay,
and then clears the ADSP2100A reset,
allowing the ADSP2100A to resume
operation.
Software on the subsystem main
processor is also used to detect latchups
below the threshold of the latch
detection circuit, bit flips that cause the
ADSP2100A to malfunction and
latchups that take place when the latch
detect circuit is disabled.
The

ADSP2100A is programmed to generate
periodiC interrupts to the main
processor. If the interrupt is not
generated, a timer in the main processor
times out and generates an interrupt.
This interrupt service routine performs a
similar procedure as the latch detect
interrupt service routine to re-start the
ADSP2100A.
A reliable latchup protection
circuit must not be sensitive to the
radiation environment. To this end, we
use a radiation hardened main
processor, a CMOS/50S 1750A. In
addition, the devices used in the latchup
protection circuitry are not sensitive'to
single event upset or latchup and are
hard enough to survive in the expected
particle environment over the mission
lifetime.
To verify that the latchup circuit
functioned properly, we exposed
samples of the commercial ADSP2100A
to heavy ions at Brookhaven National
Laboratory. In all, more than 60
latchups were generated in three
samples, with no damage to any device.
In addition, the devices stopped
operating several times due to single
event upsets; the protection circuitry
detected this state and reset the upset
device to restore proper function.
3. Transient Upset
For devices which prove to be
latchup immune and, therefore,
candidates for flight hardware, their
susceptibility to soft errors or transient
single event upset (SEU) needs to be
assessed. A fairly inclusive data base is
updated and published in odd
numbered years in the IEEE
Transactions on Nuclear Science by the
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Radiation Effects group at JPL. Another
approach is to test for SEU sensitivity
using an accelerator at the Brookhaven
or Berkeley facilities.

memories (ROMs) the test engineer
should consider if any peripheral logic
or power structures could be upset in
addition to the memory cells.

After determining the SEU
threshold and cross section as a function
of particle type and energy, we try to
categorize and assess the kinds of upsets
that occUr with their consequent impact
on the particular spacecraft system. If
the transient upset causes a serious
system malfunction such as a change of
attitude, orientation or pointing, then a
system or device level protection
scheme similar to that devised to cope
with latchup must be developed.

In general, while device level
protection devotes nodes or registers of
the device to its own self-monitoring
(thus decreasing device performance),
system level protection requires
additional hardware and/or procedures
which· do not necessarily decrease
device performance but add complexity
to system operation. The designer must
monitor the upset device with a second
hardened, intelligent controller
detecting faults exterior to the chip in
question. To rely on the system-Ievelgenerated resets requires a thorough
testing of fault detection and correction
capability. All error states should be
known, exercised and reset efficiently.

In contrast, if soft errors do not
lead to system malfunction, the designer
need only consider if the error rate for
the device itself is too high for that
device to perform acceptably. If the
device error rate in the mission
environment is low, one may use the
chip as is. If the rate is too high, some
error detection and correction (EDAC)
scheme such as a parity check may be
employed for the chip (often a memory
in this case). With any EDAC comes an
overhead exhibited as a loss of memory
cells dedicated to error checking and a
decrease in memory speed. Such
performance impacts mayor may not
prove acceptable to the system design.
Finally, it is possible that for the same
mission a chip's upset rate might be
acceptable for a science data system but
not for a command or attitude control
system.
In testing devices for single event
upset it is important to exercise and
monitor flip flops or logic gates as well
as memory registers. Even for random
access memories (RAMs) or read only

Example: FIFO Memory2
A typical 512 x 9 bit First In First
Out Memory consists of a circular buffer
of 512 words and control logic with a
read and a write pointer to keep track of
filled and empty cells. Three status flags
can be used to monitor the state of the
FIFO; the empty, half-full, and full
outputs can be used to determine if the
FIFO is empty, full, less than half full, or
greater than half full.
Two types of error can occur in
these devices. The first type, data errors
are easily detected. However, the
registers which contain the read and
write pointers can also upset. These
control errors are not so easily handled.
For instance, if the read pointer is
advanced by an upset, all the data
between the previous and current
location is lost. If the write pointer is
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upset, a block of invalid data may be
read, or a block of valid data may be
overwritten. The worst control error,
however, occurs when the read pointer
is advanced beyond the write pointer (or
when the write pointer is set behind the
read pointer) by an upset. In this case,
the entire data block is lost, and the
device must be reset before it will
function again. Control errors make up
about 10% of the total cross section for a
typical device.
Example: 93L422 Static RAM3
As an example of using a device
with a high upset rate without
protection, consider the notorious
93L422 static RAM. Fifteen of these
devices were used in a digital filter bank
in an environment causing a predicted
eight upsets per device per day. The
consequent 120 upsets a day average to
one upset every 12 minutes. The digital
filter bank accumulates 128 waveform
sample amplitudes over 40 pulses in
each burst and the burst period is 8893
microseconds. Thus, in one second,
each waveform sample represents the
average of 4498 pulses. We would not
expect the average performance to be
affected in the event of a single upset
during anyone pulse.

In this case it was also of interest
to estima te the effect of a single upset in
determining whether a perceptible
perturbation in the data might result. A
simulation of an upset in the output
memory was run. The conclusion was
that the soft error would not produce a
perturbation in the data for averaging
times greater than or equal to one
second.

Example: 80C86 Microprocessor4,5
For the case of the 80C86 microprocessor
with a predicted rate of one upset every
five days, the designer of the command
system decided it was intolerable to
reload the command system several
times a week and a replacement part
was found.
Example: 80186 Microprocessor4,5,6,7
Finally, we describe the use of the
Intel 80186 microprocessor in an
adaptive tracker. This device was
predicted to upset about once every
three days for a low earth orbit mission.
However, since the 80186 was also
susceptible to proton induced upsets, a
rate of one upset every five hours could
be reached should a large solar flare
occur. A watchdog timing scheme was
designed to cope with upsets.
In the adaptive tracker, SEUs are
detected by two watchdog timers. The
"burst rate" timer must be reset
approximately every 8.5 milliseconds,
and the "track rate" timer every 50
milliseconds. In the event that either
timer is not reset in time, a processor
reset is generated.

When a reset occurs, the
microprocessor begins executing the
system bootup routine. This bootup
routine interrogates the command word
to determine what type of reset has
occurred. In the event of an error reset,
which is the default, the initialization
routine assumes the state of the
processor is contained in writeprotected RAM. This state includes the
last mode command executed, (Idle,
Standby, Calibrate or Track), and the
values for all of the control variables.
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On reset, the initialization software
brings the adaptive tracker up in the idle
mode. This portion of the recovery
requires about 16 milliseconds. The
bootup routine then copies the last
mode command from write-protected
RAM to the command word. Finally,
the bootup routine flags the command
processor ready to run, and turns
control over to the table manager
program.
At this point, the table manager
program will invoke the command
processor, as it does whenever a
command is received, and the command
processor will execute the command
word. In executing the command word,
the command processor will set the
synchronizer parameters, and then
signal whatever task is necessary to
transfer to the correct mode of
operation. This processing requires
under 2 milliseconds to complete. Thus,
the adaptive tracker processor can
recover from an error reset to the
previous mode of operation in under
20 milliseconds.
4. Summary
We have presented a single event
decision tree and discussed some
general principles of handling single
event sensitive devices. We have given
several examples:
1) ADSP2100A - device latches,
adequate protection is possible,
performance degradation acceptable,
use with protection;
2) 93L422 - device does not latch
but has high upset rate without causing
system malfunction, use as is;

3) 80C86 - device does not latch
but has high upset rate which causes
serious system malfunction, effective
protection not possible, redesign with
replacement parti
4) 80186 - device does not latch
but has high upset rate which might
cause serious system malfunction under
certain environmental conditions,
system level protection is effective, use
with protection.
It is sometimes possible to use

devices which are sensitive to single
event effects in satellite systems.
Effective use of these devices requires
three things: good susceptibility data,
adequate protection mechanisms, and
systematic evaluation of the
appropriateness of .the protection
scheme. With these, the risk associated
with using unhardened integrated
circuits in the orbital charged particle
environment can be minimized.
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Figure 1. Single Event Effects Decision Tree
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Figure 2. Block Diagram of the latchup protection circuit for the ADSP2100A.

